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Abstract—This paper presents an application of noncoop-
erative game theory to generation expansion planning (GEP)
in a competitive electricity industry. We apply the Cournot
model of oligopoly behavior to formulate a GEP model that
may characterize expansion planning in a competitive regime,
particularly in pool-dominated generation supply industries.
Numerical experiments are conducted on a test system to analyze
generation investment and market participation decisions of
candidate expansion units that vary in costs and forced outage
rates. The numerical results point to: 1) greater industry ex-
pansion and system reliability, under Cournot competition than
under centralized expansion planning; and 2) higher probabilistic
measures of reliability from multi-player expansion than from
expansion by a traditional monopolist with an equivalent reserve
margin requirement. Furthermore, we summarize analytical
results involving a simplified version of the GEP game.
Index Terms—Economics, game theory, genetic algorithms,
power generation planning, power generation reliability, power
industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE ELECTRIC power industry in the United States isbeing restructured with the passage of recent regulation
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Several states have proposed plans to restructure the industry
within their geographic regions. While the transmission system
continues to be regulated, generation supply is being opened
to competition. Competition in the generation supply industry
will fundamentally alter the way generation expansion planning
(GEP) is conducted.
This paper describes an application of Cournot theory of oli-
gopoly to model GEP in a competitive electric power industry.
Our expansion planning model differs from the classic Cournot
model in that it incorporates operational considerations such as
plant capacity limitations and energy balance constraints. Simi-
larly to [9], Cournot style competition is employed to model the
behavior of competing generation expansion firms. However,
unlike previous work we consider separate markets for capacity
reserve and energy products. Our method for determining price
outcomes is patterned after the basic design of the California
ISO/PX System, which relies on auction markets. Furthermore,
a major focus of our investigation, absent in [9], is to examine
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implications of competition on generation system reliability in
terms of adequacy. Through numerical simulation effects of dif-
ferent scenarios of competition on system expansion and relia-
bility are analyzed.
Section II discusses traditional practices and identifies ways
competition alters GEP. Section III reviews the classic Cournot
model and its applicability in modeling expansion planning.
Section IV presents a mathematical formulation of GEP that
may characterize expansion planning in a competitive genera-
tion industry with multiple markets and multiple players. Deci-
sion variables include expansion size and amount of capacity to
devote to supplying reserves. Numerical results are presented in
Section V, while analytical results from previous work are sum-
marized in Section VI.
II. CHANGES IN EXPANSION PLANNING
Generation expansion planning has historically addressed the
problem of identifying ideal technology, expansion size, siting,
and timing of construction of new plant capacity in an economic
fashion and in a manner that ensures installed capacity ade-
quately meets projected demand growth [5]. However, deregu-
lation alters traditional GEP assumptions, models, and methods.
Whereas traditional utility practice involves solving centralized
planning programs that identify cost-minimizing plans for the
utility, under competition multiple firms individually make in-
vestment plans intended to maximize profit. Other anticipated
changes from competition include: 1) shortened planning hori-
zons due to the elimination of traditional guaranteed return on
investment; and 2) the advent of strategic interaction and gaming
among firms involved in the generation planning process. That
is, competition will cause firms to face higher risks and thus
seek quicker returns, and cause decisions of firms to mutually
affect other firms’ profits and decisions.
Despite opening up to competition, the generation supply
industry will not likely, if at all, make an immediate jump to
a purely competitive structure. The industry has historically
been comprised of a limited number of firms. Thus, we ex-
pect a deregulated generation supply industry to take on an
oligopolistic structure, that may persist depending on future
technological advancement and economics of generation.
III. COURNOT MODEL
The Cournot Model of oligopoly competition was introduced
by Augustin Cournot in 1838 [4]. The model has become a
0885–8950/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE
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classic in microeconomic oligopoly theory. Cournot games have
the following characteristics in common:
• competition occurs only in quantities
• product is nonstorable
• product is homogeneous
• market price is determined by auction
• no entry occurs during the game
• decision-making by players occurs simultaneously.
In the Cournot model, each firm chooses an output quantity to
maximize profit. Firms are assumed to produce homogeneous
goods that are nonstorable. So all quantities produced are imme-
diately sold. Market price in the model is determined through an
auction process that equates industry supply with aggregate de-
mand. Examples of Cournot style auction-based pricing can be
found in organized markets such as those for agricultural prod-
ucts like wheat, corn, and rice. The model also assumes that all
firms in the industry can be identified at the start of the game,
and that decision-making by firms occurs simultaneously. The
extent these assumptions are compatible with GEP is discussed
below.
There are many striking similarities between the classic
Cournot model and the nature of competitive generation mar-
kets. In expansion planning firms must decide on how much
capacity to expand, a decision variable in quantities.1 Also, the
assumption that products are nonstorable applies well to the pri-
mary products of competitive generation markets, energy and
capacity. Furthermore, in pool-dominated generation markets
(e.g., California ISO/PX system, former British Power Pool,
etc.) prices are primarily determined from auctions and within
each auction products are homogeneous. So although there may
be product differentiation across various generation markets,
products are homogeneous within each auction market.
The nonentry assumption of the Cournot model is to some
extent compatible with GEP. Generally, the longer the planning
period under examination the greater the likeliness of over-
looking a new entrant. But competition is inducing shorter
planning horizons. Investors now seek quicker pay-back from
investments than have regulated electric utilities. Moreover, for
the games defined in this paper in which designated players are
existing technologies, nonentry of new players (i.e., viable new
technologies) is a reasonable assumption over relatively long
periods of time.
In reality, simultaneous decision-making is not generally
descriptive of how firms make investment decisions. Never-
theless, our capacity investment model assumes simultaneous
decision-making among generation investors, in order to give
no player a first mover advantage. This enables us to study
expansion outcomes under conditions in which generating units
can be compared according to their cost and other character-
istics. Such a study may lead to some interesting comparisons
among technologies.
Once a game is formulated, outcome predictions are sought.
Outcomes of Cournot games are called Cournot equilibria.
A Cournot equilibrium is a vector of output quantities that
1There exist price decisions too in GEP. However, in pool-dominated genera-
tion industries in which prices are determined after capacity decisions are made,
GEP can be modeled as a two-stage quantity and price game. Such a game re-
duces to a Cournot game in quantities [7].
maximizes the profit of each firm given all other firms’ quantity
decisions. In mathematical terms, a Cournot equilibrium is
a vector which solves a collection of profit
maximization problems of the form:
where is any nonnegative quantity and is the profit of
player . is the total number of players in the game. We
henceforth denote total industry production by , so
that represents market price. Thus player ’s profit from
a product can be represented by ,
where denotes the vector of production quantities; is ’s
production cost curve; and is the inverse demand curve for
the product.
IV. EXPANSION PLANNING GAME
A. Scope and Assumptions
We present an analytical formulation of the generation
planning process involving decisions on new plant construction
at a single point in time with multiple technology options
available. Players in our proposed game are candidate ex-
pansion units—any viable plant technology considered for
construction. For example, players may be coal-fired, oil-fired,
nuclear, and gas turbine units or plant technologies of any other
classification.
In our proposed game, we assume a market structure pat-
terned after the California ISO/PX system. In particular, we con-
sider a single power exchange that facilitates buying and selling
of energy through auctions, much like the California Power Ex-
change. Separate markets for energy and capacity reserves are
modeled. Also, we model a real-time energy balancing market
which is supplied by real-time energy bids and winning reserve
bids. For simplicity, no bilateral energy sales are considered.
However, we do consider long-term contracts for reserves that
are procured by the ISO at a pre-established price.
Participation in each market and market outcomes art de-
termined as follows. Each player individually decides on its
capacity reserve participation level. Quantity-wise, we assume
generating units fully bid their unreserved capacity first into the
energy market, and then subsequently bid all capacity rejected
by the energy market and all contracted capacity reserves into
the real-time market. Price-wise, participants are assumed to bid
marginal costs.2 Outcomes of auctions consist of clearing prices
and production schedules specifying the amount of production
from each unit. A generator receives production payments at the
market clearing price of the auction in which its bids succeed.
B. Problem Formulation
We define the following variables.
: fuel cost of marginal unit in energy market at time
: fuel cost of marginal unit in real time market at
: load at time
2The marginal cost bidding assumption is reasonable when players are single
generating units acting alone in competition with other generators, as opposed
to owners of multiple units who can use their generation portfolios to strategize
bids.
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: energy production commitment of unit at time
: real-time production of unit at time
: generation capacity expansion decision of unit
: capacity reservation decision of unit
: industry capacity reserve offering
: forced outage rate of unit
: total capacity of existing system
: equivalent load duration curve of initial system
: system-wide average customer outage cost
: time duration of planning period.
Profit is the difference between revenues earned and costs
incurred from providing electric service. Revenues consist of
energy and real-time auction market payments and contracted
reserve payments. Expenses include operating costs, capital in-
vestment costs, and outage costs. Let represent the
profit earned by a generating unit indexed by , of size MW,
that devotes MW of its capacity to supplying reserves. Unit
’s profit function is then
where is the capacity
expansion vector comprised of all players’ decisions; is the
capacity reserve vector; and is the price of contracted
reserves as a function of industry reserve offering. rep-
resents unit ’s revenue from energy and real-time market pro-
duction; is unit ’s production cost; is ’s annualized
capital investment cost; and is ’s outage cost. Whereas
production and capital investment costs are traditional compo-
nents in generation planning, the other components are addi-
tional considerations. Consequently, they are detailed in (1)–(3).
The origins of Equation (2) is discussed in [3].
(1)
(2)
(3)
Based on the definitions and profit function previously de-
scribed, a player’s expansion planning problem can be formu-
lated as the following mathematical program.
s.t. (4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Fig. 1. A four-phase description of the cournot solution algorithm.
Each player seeks to maximize its profit subject to operational
and physical constraints. Constraint (4) prevents a unit’s ca-
pacity reserve commitment from exceeding its capacity rating.
Constraint sets (5) and (7) are production constraints limiting
participation in the energy and real-time markets according to
resource availability of a unit at any given time. The former
constraint set limits the amount of capacity a unit can supply in
the energy market to its plant capacity minus its contracted re-
serve commitment. Similarly, the latter constraint set prevents
the amount of capacity a unit supplies in the real-time market
from exceeding the amount available after discounting energy
market commitments. Constraint sets (6) and (8) are analogous
to energy balance constraints in the energy and real-time mar-
kets, respectively. In the program formulation above, demand
in the energy market and demand in the real-time market are as-
sumed to be inelastic. So constraints (6) and (8) take the form
of inequality constraints.3
C. Solution Algorithm
For the generation expansion planning game described, we
find Cournot equilibria by using an iterative search procedure.
The solution algorithm executes at two levels. At the bottom
level, each player maximizes its profit one by one in turn with
all other players’ actions fixed. At the top level, the algorithm
searches for a Cournot equilibrium solution to the overall game.
A vector of player decisions for which no player changes its
plan after an entire round of optimization among all players is
a Cournot equilibrium. The top level of the algorithm iterates
until such an equilibrium is found.
Alternatively, the solution algorithm described may be
viewed as part of an expansion planning procedure that pre-
scribes rules for interaction among generation planners. The
procedure is divided into four distinct phases: a self-planning
phase for each player; a communication phase between players;
a re-optimization phase among players; and a termination
phase in which a stable solution outcome is found. See Fig. 1.
In the initial phase, the independent system operator (ISO)
forecasts the load and determines the price it will offer for
3Inelastic demand evokes an inequality constraint since it can lead to a sit-
uation in which demand exceeds available supply. On the other hand, elastic
demand would inevitably yield a point of intersection between market supply
and demand curves. For example, in the case of elastic demand for energy in-
tersection would occur at quantity L , in constraint (6), and (6) would take the
form of an equality constraint. Thus, by choice of constraint type the proposed
formulation can accommodate both cases of demand elasticity.
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TABLE I
EXISTING GENERATING UNITS
TABLE II
CANDIDATE EXPANSION UNITS
capacity reserves.4 Afterwards the ISO broadcasts load and
capacity price information to all players, who then individually
form their own initial expansion plans that specify size of
expansion for their plant technology. In the second phase,
communication is exchanged between each player and the ISO.
Players report their initial plans for expansion to the ISO, and
the ISO broadcasts the information it receives to all players. In
the third phase, one by one in rounds each player re-optimizes
its expansion plan given all other players’ updated expansion
plans. For example, in the first round of the third phase an
arbitrary player, say player A, updates its expansion plan
knowing the plans of all other players. Player A then reports its
updated plan to the ISO who transmits the information to the
next player, B. Player B then re-optimizes its expansion plan
and reports its updated plan to the ISO. The process repeats
with each subsequent player remaining in the round. This phase
of the algorithm iterates until no player alters its expansion
plan for one entire round, after which the algorithm reaches
phase four and terminates. Since the resulting solution vector
of expansion decisions has the property that no player can
improve its profit by changing its plan, the solution vector is a
Cournot equilibrium.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Test System
A numerical test system is adapted from [6]. There are six
existing generating units in the system, all listed in Table I in
order of increasing operating cost. Information on plant sizes,
operating costs, and forced outage rates are also given in the
table.
Candidate expansion units in the test system are listed in
Table II. They consist of a coal-fired plant, an oil-fired plant, and
4A technique for determining the ideal price for capacity reserves from a so-
cial welfare perspective is discussed in [3].
a gas turbine unit (i.e., one base load unit, one cycling unit, and
one peaking unit). Their maximum sizes, operating costs, cap-
ital costs, and forced outage rates are also included in the table.
Each candidate expansion unit, or player, acts as an individual
profit-maximizing entity in the generation expansion planning
game. Also, to reduce the number of decision variables we only
allow candidate expansion units to participate in the capacity re-
serve market in the test system.
For our numerical simulations in which demand is assumed
inelastic, load is taken as the chronological load profile of the
IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE RTS) [10] with peak load
of 2850 MW. In our final simulation set in which demand is
assumed elastic, we represent demand by linear, decreasing
inverse demand curves that have -intercepts at 100 $/MW and
slopes ranging from to $/MW . The slopes were
chosen so as to produce the IEEE RTS load duration curve
when intersecting inverse demand curves with an industry
supply curve derived from Cournot expansion under inelastic
demand.
B. Expansion Outcomes and Trends
Expansion results for five different competitive scenarios
among three candidate expansion units are presented in
Table III. In the first scenario, Cournot competition, each
generating unit acts independently to maximize its profit. In the
second case, players collude by jointly maximizing profit in a
cartel. The last three scenarios involve Cournot duopoly com-
petition between a single player and a coalition comprised of
the remaining players. In our example the coal plant is labeled
unit 1, the oil-fired plant is labeled unit 2, and the gas turbine
plant is labeled unit 3. Decision outcomes, resulting profits,
and reserve margins (RM) for each competitive scenario are
summarized in the table. The amount of reserve margin after
expansion provides a deterministic indication of generation
system adequacy. The table also shows probabilistic measures
of adequacy such as expected unserved energy (EUE) and loss
of load probability (LOLP). The dataset was gathered under the
assumption of inelastic demand.
Comparing outcomes in Table III, notice that the formation
of the grand coalition or cartel yields the greatest profit but
lowest output; whereas Cournot competition yields least aggre-
gate profit but greatest output. Moreover, duopoly outcomes fall
in between cartel and Cournot outcomes. These results support
theoretical predictions stemming from analysis of the classic
Cournot model. Theory predicts total output increases and ag-
gregate profit decreases as the number of noncolluding players
in the industry increases [8].
Numerical results in Table III also indicate a direct correlation
between total output and reliability, and an opposing relation-
ship between profit and reliability. Namely, with greater total ex-
pansion generation system reliability improves in all reliability
measures examined. Moreover, the greater the aggregate profit
of players, the worse system reliability is. These patterns are
consistent among all competitive scenarios listed. In particular,
the formation of the grand coalition or cartel yields the greatest
profit but worst reliability rating; whereas Cournot competition
yields least aggregate profit but the best reliability rating. Du-
opoly outcomes fall in between cartel and Cournot outcomes,
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT COMPETITIVE SCENARIOS
TABLE IV
AVERAGE COSTS OF CANDIDATE UNITS IN COURNOT OUTCOME
with duopoly {2}, {1,3} achieving the greatest reliability rating
but least profit among all duopolies. These trends suggest that
players in collusion will collectively increase their profits at the
expense of overall generation system adequacy.
Results also show cartel expansion produced a negative
reserve margin. That is, total expansion by the cartel fell below
peak demand, illustrating an instance when players would
find it profitable to under-expand. This example points to
the possibility that firms with monopoly-like power may opt
to under-expand in a situation of inelastic demand, thereby
degrading reliability of the generation supply system.
C. Average Costs
Table III reveals in all scenarios candidate players 2 and 3
devote their entire plant capacity to supplying reserves in the
capacity reserve market; whereas player 1 offers only a portion
of its capacity to the reserve market. We investigate a possible
explanation for these outcomes by examining average costs of
each candidate expansion unit and comparing costs against av-
erage energy market clearing prices (MCPs) in each scenario.
Average cost of a generating unit is equal to its capital cost
per unit of energy production plus its operating cost. This
cost may be computed according to the following expression:
average cost opcost capital cost annual energy ,
where opcost is the plant’s operating cost, capital cost is its
annualized capital construction cost, and annual energy is its
combined energy and real-time market production.
To illustrate how average cost is computed, data comprising
average cost calculations for one competitive scenario is pro-
vided in Table IV. In the table, the gas turbine unit’s average
TABLE V
AVERAGE COST AND PRICE COMPARISONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT
COMPETITIVE SCENARIOS
cost is infinity since its annual energy production is zero. Note
that the gas turbine unit receives revenue only from the capacity
reserve market.
For each competitive scenario, Table V summarizes average
costs of each candidate expansion unit along with average
market clearing prices in both the energy and real-time markets.
The table reveals that average cost of the coal unit is less
than the average MCP; whereas average costs of the oil and
gas turbine units are higher than the average MCP in every
scenario. High average costs of oil and gas turbine plants
compared to the average MCP imply these plants would receive
insufficient revenue from participation in the energy market.
Compensation incurred from their participation would fall
short of their production and capital costs. On the other hand,
payments from capacity reserve contracts could well exceed
each player’s average cost. Therefore, the oil and gas plants
which have high average costs commit their entire capacity
to the capacity reserve market. Thus these units receive their
bulk of revenues in the form of capacity reserve payments.
As was the trend for profit, average MCP is highest under
cartel expansion and lowest under Cournot competition, with
MCPs resulting from duopoly cases falling in between these
two extremes. Similar trends involving average RTP’s can be
observed from Table V. Since MCP and RTP reflect prices at
which buyers purchase electricity, numerical results indicate
customers are best off when generation expanders face Cournot
competition and worst off when they collude in a cartel. This
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Fig. 2. Expansion results with change in operating cost.
conclusion is also supported by predictions of microeconomic
theory.
An unexpected result can be noted in Table V. Namely, av-
erage RTP is less than average MCP in all scenarios. If real mar-
kets are any reflection, one would expect RTP to exceed MCP
on average, as has been the case involving California’s energy
balancing market. A reversal in results may be explained by how
real-time demand is determined in our mathematical model, as
revealed by constraint (8). We approximate real-time energy de-
mand as the amount of remedial energy needed to cover forced
outages of units scheduled in the energy market. So no other
sources of demand forecast errors, such as strategic behavior of
energy market participants, are considered. Strategic behavior
occurs when participants purposely deviate from scheduled en-
ergy commitments in hopes of increasing profit by relying on
real-time market prices. Such deviations from scheduled energy
in reality may significantly boost real-time demand and drive
up RTP. However, to retain a simpler model we did not con-
sider other factors of uncertainty influencing real-time demand
besides plant outages [although other factors may be consid-
ered by adding terms to the right hand side of constraint (8)].
So real-time demand is only a fraction of scheduled energy in
our model. Thus numerical results showing MCPs that exceed
RTPs are consistent with our model.
D. Expansion With Change in Operating Cost
Fig. 2 displays expansion outcomes given various percent
changes in operating costs for the Cournot and cartel scenarios.
The figure illustrates that as operating cost increases total ex-
pansion also increases. Also, cartel expansion remains less than
aggregate expansion by Cournot players despite changes in op-
erating costs.
E. Probabilistic Reliability Improvement
Next we examine the cartel’s output decision under a reg-
ulatory obligation to meet a pre-established minimum reserve
margin requirement. Such a criterion is analogous to the tradi-
tional electric utility’s obligation to serve. In our example, the
minimum reserve margin imposed on the cartel is set equal to
the reserve margin resulting from Cournot competition under
inelastic demand.
Table VI compares output decisions of the constrained cartel
with those of Cournot players. Numerical results indicate that
although reserve margins are identical, the Cournot solution
improves reliability probabilistically over the cartel outcome.
EUE and LOLP are common probabilistic measures of gener-
ation system reliability. Unlike reserve margin computations,
EUE and LOLP take into account sizes and forced outage rates
of units that comprise the generating system. Because Cournot
expansion produces a more even spread of capacity construc-
tion among the three candidate technologies, Cournot expansion
leads to improved probabilistic reliability ratings compared to
traditional utility expansion with an equivalent reserve margin
requirement. So results suggest competition in generation ex-
pansion may improve reliability.
F. Outcomes Under Elastic Demand
Outcomes of the test system under an assumption of elastic
demand are presented in this subsection. A collection of
8760 hourly inverse demand curves that vary as described in
Section V-A are modeled and outcomes for a few scenarios
of competition are summarized in Table VII. The first row of
Table VII presents social welfare maximizing decisions of each
player. By definition, the social welfare maximizing solution
benefits society above all other expansion plans. Welfare is the
difference between benefit of electricity use to consumers and
total cost of providing electric service to suppliers [1, p. 33].
Hourly benefit can be computed by integrating the area under
the inverse demand curve up to the quantity of load at the
specified hour. So total benefit to consumers is computed from
summing these areas under each hourly inverse demand curve
in the planning period.
Results from simulating Cournot and cartel competition are
also summarized in Table VII. Unlike the cartel and welfare
maximizing solutions which are unique, different Cournot solu-
tions were discovered over the course of many algorithm runs.
None of the Cournot solutions found, however, dominate any
other. They are pareto-optimal since each player favors a dif-
ferent Cournot solution. Interestingly enough, each Cournot so-
lution shares the same aggregate expansion and capacity reserve
totals. Furthermore, Cournot aggregate expansion falls between
that resulting from social welfare maximization and cartel profit
maximization, as expected from theory. Moreover, the social
welfare maximizing solution yields greatest expansion, while
the cartel solution yields least expansion but most profit. This
trend also adheres to theoretical predictions from classic oli-
gopoly theory.
VI. THEORETICAL RESULTS
Although classic Cournot oligopoly theory does not strictly
apply to GEP due to the constraints found in our model, several
results have been extended to a subclass of GEP games formu-
lated. Reference [2] details our development of analytical proofs
that compare outcomes of Cournot competition in GEP to that
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TABLE VI
COURNOT EXPANSION VERSUS CARTEL EXPANSION WITH MINIMUM RESERVE MARGIN REQUIREMENT
TABLE VII
SUMMARY OF RESULTS UNDER ELASTIC DEMAND
of cartel expansion in terms of total capacity output, reserve
margin, and incentive to introduce new technologies. Analyt-
ical results in the work include:
• Cournot exceeds cartel expansion in total output.
• Cournot exceeds cartel expansion in reserve margin.
• Cournot expansion after introduction of new technology
is no less than monopoly expansion.
That is, we have proven that under certain assumptions industry
expansion and reserve margin resulting from Cournot competi-
tion is higher than those resulting from joint-profit maximiza-
tion by a cartel. We have also proven that total expansion by
Cournot players after introduction of new technology is no less
than monopoly expansion. Such a result implies that a monopoly
may lack sufficient incentive to introduce new technologies. See
[2] for more details on conclusions, proofs, and assumptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Electric power industry restructuring has introduced new
questions and concerns in power systems planning. Primary
questions in the debate include: what is the best way to restruc-
ture the industry; what are the economic justifications; and
does competition improve or compromise reliability? Our work
offers a inter-disciplinary approach toward addressing such
questions prevalent during industry restructuring. We address
the need for a theoretically well-founded methodology for
studying generation expansion in the context of a competitive
electric power industry. In particular, we formulate a game
that can be used to study expansion planning in competitive
environments dominated by auction markets. And we verify
expansion outcomes and trends identified from numerical
application of our model support popular economic beliefs
regarding the merits of increased competition. Merits that were
identified include greater industry expansion, lower prices,
and higher reliability in certain cases of oligopoly competition
compared to cartel expansion. The proposed methodology may
find application by planning engineers or regulators seeking to
analyze system-wide generation expansion.
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